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ception by which the distinctions between subject and object,
knowing and known, knowing and being, are first drawn. Every-
thing is thus tested by the subjective method of philosophy, that
is, by apperception as an act of knowing, the act of experience.
Even apperception itself does not escape. I t might seem, at
first sight, as if apperception, being a conscious act of attention,
so modified the states of consciousness which are its objects, as to
prevent their being seen as they really are, distorting in the very
act of perceiving them ; as if it partly made the phenomena, while
professing only to witness them. But it must be remembered, that an
apperception is as much an object to subsequent apperceptions, as
primary states of consciousness are to rudimentary apperceptions.
Apperception can itself be analysed, and, by comparison of many
cases, its comparatively invariable contribution to knowledge, the
greater vividness due to its act of attention, can be distinguished
from the highly variable contributions of its various objects. This
cannot be done with the Subject, or with the Object, supposed as
real factors of knowledge, because these factors, taken by them-
selves, have no phenomenal content. Whereas apperception, as
subjective moment, is itself phenomenal and analysable, by sub-
sequent apperceptions to which it becomes an object. In short,
apperception is the name for a distinct experience, whenever it
occurs; and, being phenomenal, one experience is controlled and
tested by others. In this sense it is that apperception is tested
by itself. If as an act of attention it modifies phenomena, it can
also assign the limits of the modification.
Accordingly, when the final question is put, What is Appercep-
tion ? it is put by one apperception to the rest, recalled in memory
from previous experience, and the answer also is given by apper-
ception. The answer, which turns partly upon the objective
reality of acts of attention, can here be only briefly given, without
developing the consequences with which it teems. It is this.
Apperception, as an object of apperception simply, is the act of
experiencing ; but apperception, as an object in relation to other
objects of apperception, is a psychological process, depending upon
those real physiological and psychological conditions, which give




I have read Miss Martin's able Note on this subject (in MIND
XXVUI.) with much interest; but (through my fault rather
than hers) she has not quite caught my view. I fully allow
that the quantitative axiom or intuition on which I dwelt has
no power to drive any one to adopt the universalistic rather
than the egoistic standpoint. But the altruistic or universal-
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istic impulse operates in conduct before it is philosophically
recognised—(Miss Martin does not seem to have noticed that I
expressly laid, down as my fundamental fact ' I feel a desire for
your happiness')—and its operation forces on me the conviction
that it is happiness qua happiness, not qud mine, which is for me
the general end of action; for while my seeking my happiness
(which I often do) is quite compatible with the hypothesis that
happiness qud happiness is my end, my seeking your happiness
is quite incompatible with the hypothesis that happiness qud
mine is my end. Nor does the immense amount of casual
Egoism in the world at all refute my view that, with those who
reflect at all, this attitude is the normal one. I t is commonly
not by deliberate choice as against the general happiness, that
a piece of egoistic happiness is preferred, but by keeping the
idea of the general happiness out of sight; or, in many cases,
by some such ' flattering unction' as, e.g., that the suffering
which might be alleviated, at the cost of some indulgence of
one's own, is so infinitesimal a drop in the ocean of misery
as to make the sacrifice quixotic. This voluntary blindness or
self-deception does not, as a rule, outlive the actual moments
of gratification; and the perpetual reversion, in the intervals
of life between, to the impartial and reflective standpoint of
the general end, cannot but give to such moments the air of
aberrations. And by calling happiness qud happiness ' the gene-
ral end of action,' I mean neither that it is what ought to be
aimed at, nor what is at any moment desired or most desired:
I mean that it is that with which the idea of ultimate end is
most habitually associated. A man may say with truth that
success at the bar is his ultimate and pervading end, without
implying that he ought to have adopted that profession rather
than another; and if he neglects important business for a day,
and amuses himself in the country, which is what he that day
most desires to do, he will feel unreasonable, because he has
within a short period of time acted as if two mutually exclusive
things, amusement and success at the bar, were ' the end'. I
feel a similar unreasonableness when I adopt, through Egoism,
some course which entails on the whole less happiness, less
therefore of that which in my habitual view and by inveterate
association is identified with end-stuff; for conduct gave me the
chance of conforming to that view, in spite of my opposed ego-
istic desire. And here has come in the axiom. Happiness being
posited as the general end, then, in every alternative which pre-
sents a pair of particular ends, it ought to be seen that that
which entails more happiness is the greater end—has more of
what is habitually regarded as conduct-directing stuff; and a
jar is produced by conduct which, being directed to what has
less conduct-directing stuff, would lead an impartial spectator
to suppose that the above axiom is not seen.
Those to whom this view appears logical (if there be any such)
 at U








NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS. 103
might still hold that it has no particular substance or import-
ance. Personally, I should be hard to convince on this point;
inasmuch as I never consciously prefer or feel inclined to prefer
my own happiness to the greater happiness of others, without
feeling an obstacle in the passionless axiomatic reflection that
two is more than one, and that my happiness, since it ' cannot
be a more important part of good, taken universally, than the
equal happiness of any other person,' ought (from my habitual
standpoint as to the end of action) to be a lesser ».im than the
greater happiness of any other person or persons. Whether the
axiom, when this latter obligational form is given to it, ceases
to be ' scientific,' seems to me a merely verbal question. The
word is at any rate an intelligible one, to describe that quality
of quantitative axioms which is common to them all, and in
comparison with which any element that is not common to them
all—that differentiates, e.g., a quantitative axiom in Ethics from
a quantitative axiom in Geometry—appears quite subordinate.
EDMUND GUBNEY.
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